New Jersey Car Accident Law Blog : New Jersey Personal Injury Lawyer & Attorney : Richard Schnoll : Cohn Lifland Pearlman & Knopf Law Firm : NJ Auto Accidents, Car Crashes

In McDougall v. Lamm, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court recently considered whether to allow damages for emotional distress to a plaintiff who witnessed the violent death of her dog. 

While out for a walk, the plaintiff’s dog was attacked and killed by another larger dog.  The plaintiff witnessed the attack and sued the owner of the larger dog.  At trial plaintiff argued that under Portee v. Jaffee (see posting of November 17, 2010) she was entitled to damages for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of witnessing the defendant’s dog attack and kill hers.  In support of her claim, plaintiff explained that she had a “developed a considerable attachment” to her dog in the wake of her divorce from her husband and the recent departure from home for college of her three sons. 

The trial judge denied plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress but awarded her damages for the replacement cost of the dog.  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that she was entitled to damages for emotional distress under Portee, since she “was forced to witness the death of a companion dog, with whom she had established a loving relationship.”  Plaintiff qualified her argument by asserting “that such damages should be limited to pet owners who are able to demonstrate a close loving relationship, perhaps based in part on taking care of the pet.” 

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.  In reaching its decision, the court took into account the already-existing laws which impose liability on dog owners who “[permit] their dogs to run loose, without being leashed.”  See N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, 4:19-4 and 4:19-15.16(e).  The court concluded that “in light of the comprehensive statutory scheme designed to deter dog owners from allowing their dogs to run loose and penalizing them if they do so” plaintiff had failed to articulate sufficient policy reasons for imposing liability beyond that already imposed by existing legislation.    

The Holidays are upon us once again, and with the season come invitations to parties, dinners, cocktail hours and other events to celebrate it.  You may even be planning to host your own holiday gathering.  If you are hosting an event this holiday season and plan to serve alcohol, please keep the following in mind.    

Under New Jersey law, a host can be held liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from the negligent provision of alcoholic beverages in some circumstances.  To recover against a social host, an injured person must prove three things: (1) that the host served alcohol to a person who physically manifested signs of being intoxicated; (2) that the host served the intoxicated person while ignoring some foreseeable harm that could result from serving the intoxicated person; and (3) that the injury was the result of the intoxicated person’s operation of a motor vehicle.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6.    

It is important to note that the social host liability set forth above applies only to third-persons and minors.  That is to say, a social host is not liable for the injuries the guest might sustain as a result of consuming alcoholic beverages provided by the host, so long as the guest is of the legal drinking age.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.7. 

This holiday season, host safely!  Serve alcohol to your guests in a responsible manner; never serve alcohol to underage people; and encourage your guests to party with a designated driver.      

Under New Jersey law, a person has 60 days to “pay and satisfy” a judgment rendered against him for damages resulting in personal injury, death or property damage in excess of $500.00 arising from a motor vehicle accident.  If the judgment is not paid within 60 days, the Motor Vehicle Commission may suspend the judgment-debtor’s driving privileges until the judgment is satisfied. N.J.S.A. 39:6-35. 

In a recent case before the Appellate Division, a judgment-debtor (the “debtor”) had his license suspended when he failed to make payments relating to a settlement arising out of a car collision. The debtor rear-ended another vehicle, causing approximately $730.00 in damage.  The owner of the rear-ended vehicle filed a collision claim with her insurance company, Proformance Insurance Company (“Proformance”), which paid the claim.  Proformance then sued the debtor to recover the money it paid to its insured.  The matter eventually settled, and the debtor agreed to make eleven monthly payments of $50.00 to Proformance.

When the debtor failed to make two settlement payments, Proformance’s attorneys filed for judgment against the debtor and an order for judgment was entered against him.  The attorneys forwarded a copy of the order to the debtor’s lawyer, along with a cover letter which advised that if the judgment were not paid, then “post-judgment remedies would be commenced, ‘which may include the suspension of your client’s driving and registration privileges.’”  Neither the debtor nor his lawyer responded. 

When the debtor failed to satisfy the judgment, the Proformance attorneys advised the court of the delinquency and submitted a certification of judgment to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (“MVC”).  After receiving the certification of judgment, the MVC suspended the debtor’s driving privileges. 

After satisfying the judgment, the debtor filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that N.J.S.A. 39:6-35 is unconstitutional “due to the absence of a notice requirement or, alternatively, that the revocation procedures employed against him deprived him of his constitutional rights.”  The Proformance attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment and sought an award of counsel fees.  The court denied the debtor’s motion, granted the attorneys’ cross-motion and awarded counsel fees.  The debtor appealed, again claiming that “his constitutional rights were violated because the MVC suspended his driving privileges without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.  While the court found that “notice is required where revocation of driving privileges results from action taken by the director [of MVC] rather than, for example, by a court,” the “[debtor] suffered no harm as a result of the MVC’s actions.” The court recognized that there was a two-day delay between the effective date of debtor’s suspension and his receipt of the MVC’s notice, but concluded that the delay was “of no consequence” since the Proformance attorneys had advised him of the potential driving suspension “more than six months before the actual license revocation.”